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Abstract 
Restrictive employment protection legislation has been highlighted as one of the key 
reasons for lower labour productivity in Europe compared to the US. A variety of channels 
have been suggested, including a focus on the direct effect of employment protection on 
worker effort. Evidence now exists that demonstrates robust, but small, effects of 
employment protection on effort. These appear too small to generate marked cross-country 
differences in labour productivity. This paper revisits this issue using representative data of 
private sector workers in Spain. A range of legislative changes aimed at reducing the 
incidence of temporary employment are used to estimate the effect of permanent employment 
on one aspect of effort, absenteeism. A substantial effect of permanent contracts on 
absenteeism is found. These results suggest that cross-country differences in employment 
protection have the potential, through the effect on worker effort, to have a substantial impact 
on labour productivity.  
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Differences in labor productivity between Europe and the US are an issue of long-
standing interest (Prescott, 2004; Timmer and van Ark, 2005 and van Ark, O’Mahony, and 
Timmer, 2008). A range of explanations have been posited to explain these differences. For 
instance, it has been suggested that the `knowledge economy’ emerged much more slowly in 
Europe when compared to the US (Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl 2004; van 
Ark et al. 2008). Another explanation, and a highly contentious one, is that markedly more 
strict employment protection legislation (EPL) in Europe leads to lower labour productivity 
(Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn, 2009; Dolado and Stucchi, 2008; Capellari, Dell’Aringa and 
Leonardi, 2012). 
EPL has the potential to affect productivity through its influence on labor market 
transitions and unemployment: this has been the source of a large and contentious literature 
(Lazear, 1990; Addison, Teixera and Grosso, 2000; Blanchard and Portugal, 2001; Acemoglu 
and Angrist, 2001 and Kugler and Pica, 2008). Along with these effects on labour market 
transitions EPL could also influence worker productivity more directly through its influence 
on worker effort decisions (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008 and Dolado, Ortigueira and Stucchi, 
2011). Recently, a literature has developed that seeks to estimate this effect, focusing 
primarily on absenteeism (Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001; Ichino and Riphahn, 2004 and 
2005; Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005; Olsson, 2009, Scoppa, 2010a; Bradley, Green and 
Leeves, 2014). This literature can be summarized as showing robust and statistically 
significant effects of employment protection on absenteeism; more employment protection 
increases absenteeism. While these papers typically compare worker behaviour across large 
variations in employment protection, it must be recognized that the economic magnitude of 
these estimated effects are quite small. For instance, Ichino and Riphahn (2005) show that 
Italian bank workers who pass a 12 week probation period increase absence by 0.04 of a day 
per week, while Bradley et al. (2014) show that public sector workers who move from 
temporary to permanent contracts increase absence by 0.017 of a day per week. These effects 
seem too small to lead to large differences in labour productivity. Other studies find larger 
effects in specific settings related to small firms. Olsson (2009) finds a decrease in sickness 
absence of 13% among firms of less than 10 workers in Sweden who experienced a reduction 
in employment protection strength, and Scoppa (2010a) examine the effect of an increase in 
dismissal costs in small Italian firms and find an increase in sickness absence of 18%. 
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Finally, previous evidence for Spain demonstrates a small effect of permanent contracts on 
the incidence of absenteeism (Jimeno and Toharia, 1996). 
In this paper we revisit this issue and provide new evidence on the effect of permanent 
contracts on private sector worker absence across an entire labor market. Using variation in 
the probability of assignment to permanent contracts that result from a series of legislative 
changes in Spain, we demonstrate larger effects of contract type on worker absence than 
previous estimates. We argue that these are of a magnitude large enough to generate 
economically meaningful differences in worker productivity.  
In the European context the key variation in employment protection relates to 
differences between temporary contracts and permanent contracts. Temporary contracted 
workers are relatively easy to fire or face non-renewal of contract while the dismissal of 
permanent workers is, typically, extremely difficult. In the case where dismissal of permanent 
contract workers does occur this may still impose large costs on the employer. Spain is a 
particularly interesting case as it is known for both very stringent employment protection of 
permanent employees and at the same time has the highest incidence of temporary 
employment contracts in the EU. More than 30% of the Spanish workforce over the 1990-
2007 period was employed on a fixed-term contract at any given point in time (Bentolila, 
Dolado and Jimeno, 2008), and these workers have very little employment protection. 
Previous evidence suggests that there is limited mobility between temporary and permanent 
contracts, for instance temporary contract worker chance of moving into permanent 
employment appears no higher than that of unemployed individuals (Güell and Petrongolo, 
2007).  
The temptation in this context is to compare temporary and permanent workers to 
provide a measure of the effect of contract type on effort. However, the identification of the 
effect of permanent employment on workers’ effort is complicated by a number of issues 
related to the non-random selection of workers into employment contracts. First, contract 
type is not randomly distributed across the labour market and temporary contracts are, for 
instance, concentrated amongst the young, women, immigrants and the less skilled (Kahn, 
2007). Moreover, temporary jobs are characterized by features that may make them on 
average less desirable, such as lower levels of work-related training (Arulampalam and 
Booth, 1998; Draca and Green, 2004), lower wages (Booth, Francesconi and Frank, 2002), 
poorer working conditions, and an increased risk of work-related accidents (Guadalupe, 
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2003). A further complication is that these contracts could be used for specific reasons that 
may condition effort choices. For instance, they may be used by employers as a buffer against 
cyclical fluctuations and/or for screening purposes (Booth et al. 2002; Green and Leeves, 
2004). In the latter case, under imperfect information regarding their productivity, this may 
lead temporary workers to increase their effort so as to augment their probability of being 
retained by the firm.  
Together this suggests a variety of observed and unobserved factors that influence 
both the probability of being hired on a permanent contract and effort choices by workers. 
This suggests an endogeneity problem leading to biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
causal effect of contract type on absenteeism. This paper investigates the effect of permanent 
contracts on workers’ effort by exploiting three employment protection reforms between 
1997 and 2002 in Spain that incentivized private sector firms to offer permanent contracts to 
certain groups of workers while leaving others unaffected. These reforms are used as a source 
of exogenous variation in permanent employment, which is then used to estimate contract 
effects on absenteeism. Previous research has already shown that these types of labor reforms 
affect the likelihood of being employed on a temporary contract. Kahn (2010) finds an effect 
of employment protection reforms on the incidence of temporary jobs for the countries of the 
EU-15 from 1996 to 2001. Dolado et al. (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2002 reforms in Spain 
to identify the exogenous variation in the share of temporary workers within firms so as to 
evaluate the impact of the extended use of temporary contracts on the productivity of Spanish 
manufacturing firms. Kugler, Jimeno and Hernanz (2003) demonstrate an increase in 
permanent employment for men under 30 and over 45 years old with a difference in 
difference analysis of the 1997 reform in Spain. The series of reforms and the large scale 
nature of temporary work in Spain make it an ideal setting to analyse the effect of contract 
type on absence. In this way, we extend earlier research on absence and employment 
protection (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Olsson 2009; Scoppa 2010a; Bradley et al. 2014).  
Our results suggest that being employed on a permanent contract increases the 
probability of being absent from work due to sickness by approximately 5.3 percentage 
points, and increases time absent by approximately 0.30 of a day per week. This estimate is 
substantially larger than that reported in the previous literature (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; 
Olsson, 2009; Scoppa, 2010a; Bradley et al. 2014) and we argue that it is of an economically 
significant magnitude. Our institutional setting covers an entire labor market, where 
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temporary workers may be employed in a variety of occupational and industry settings. While 
not the focus of our paper we provide evidence that changes in incentives to firms influence 
the assignment of workers to types of employment contracts across the labor market. We test 
the sensitivity of our instrumental variable results to violations of the exclusion restriction, 
i.e. that the reforms do not directly influence absenteeism, using the approach set out by 
Conley, Hansen and Rossi (2012). Our results add to previous research by providing evidence 
of employment protection effects on absence in a broader economic and labor market setting.  
   
Institutional background and data  
Institutional background 
Spain’s labor market is characterized by high unemployment and high rates of 
temporary employment; the latter is the highest in Europe (14% and 33% in the EU-27 and 
Spain in 2005, respectively). Figure 1 demonstrates the evolution of the rate of temporary 
employment in Spain and the countries of the EU-15 and EU-27 (See Dolado, Garcia-Serrano 
and Jimeno (2002) for a survey on temporary employment in Spain).  
{{Place Figure 1 about here}} 
Temporary contracts in their modern form were introduced in Spain in 1984 as an 
attempt to combat high unemployment rates. Specifically, a contract (Contrato temporal de 
fomento de empleo) was created under which individuals could be hired for a maximum 
duration of three years, with no constraints. Temporary contracts did exist prior to this (from 
1976 on) but were only allowed in very specific jobs that were temporary in nature, such as 
seasonal work. The 1984 legislative change removed this link between temporary work and 
job type. This reform led to a large and rapid increase in the use of temporary contracts. 
While there was no necessary link between job and contract type, in reality the growth in 
temporary contracts was concentrated in what could be considered low quality jobs. 
Dismissal of temporary contract workers was relatively easy with no dismissal compensation. 
In contrast, permanent workers remained very hard to dismiss. Permanent workers must 
receive 30 days notice of dismissal. If the dismissal is due to objectively bad conduct of the 
worker there is no further compensation. However, if the dismissal is due to poor demand 
conditions of the firm, dismissed workers receive 20 days full pay per year worked with the 
firm up to a maximum of 12 months full pay. If the dismissal is for any other reasons, 
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compensation rises to 45 days per year worked with a maximum of 42 months full pay. In 
practice, most dismissals are not for the first two reasons and maximum compensation is 
paid. Moreover, if a dismissal was contested by the worker for being unfair and a judgement 
subsequently was made against the firm (i.e. unfair dismissal) they had to pay full wages for 
the period between dismissal and trial. This coupled with the relatively slow time to trial in 
Spain implies a large additional dismissal cost. Together, this helps to explain why temporary 
contracts proliferated once they were introduced.   
The scale of the temporary employment sector generated by the original reform was 
eventually viewed as undesirable and has led to a number of subsequent reforms aimed at 
reducing the level of temporary employment, and reducing the size of the disparity between 
permanent and temporary contract conditions. Of specific interest is the series of reforms that 
began in 1997. In 1997 a new type of permanent contract was created (Contrato de Fomento 
de la Contratacion Indefinida, CFCI). The key characteristics were tax breaks for 2 years for 
firms to hire a worker on this type of contract, and lower potential dismissal costs than 
standard permanent contracts. The lower dismissal costs of CFCI workers primarily took the 
form of a lower level of compensation of 33 days full pay per year worked (as compared to 
45 for other permanent workers) and a reduction in the maximum period of full pay from 42 
to 24 months. Only certain groups of workers could be offered these contracts, 18-29 year 
olds, workers older than 45 years, long-term unemployed (at least one year), disabled workers 
and workers currently on temporary contracts within the firm. The eligible groups were 
subsequently expanded in 2001 to also include 16 and 17 year olds, unemployed women 
between 16 and 45 years old, those unemployed for at least 6 months and women in sectors 
where they were under-represented. Another key change that reduced the `distance’ between 
contract types was that, in certain cases, temporary contract workers were now eligible for 
dismissal compensation of 8 days. 
Further reforms on the 14
th
 of December 2002, extended this contract to women who 
gave birth in the last 24 months, but also introduced `express dismissal’ (despido express). 
This lowered dismissal costs of all permanent workers as the employer did not have to pay 
processing wages if they accepted that the dismissal was unfair within 48 hours, but still had 
to pay dismissal compensation. Finally in 2006 (active from the 31
st
 December 2006) these 
CFCIs were extended to cover essentially all workers. In addition, the tax breaks for hiring 
these workers were changed from a proportion of the wage to a specific amount, which favors 
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the hiring of lower wage workers on these contracts. The period of payment of these breaks 
was also extended from 2 to 4 years. Together these can be seen as progressively inclusive 
reforms, in terms of coverage, that provide incentives for firms to hire workers on permanent 
contracts.  
In terms of the impact of these reforms on the Spanish labor market, previous research 
demonstrates that the reforms of the 1990s had a very limited effect on the use of 
employment contracts in Spain (see for instance Kugler et al. 2003; García Perez and 
Rebollo, 2009a and 2009b and Mendez, 2012). By the mid-2000s, the share of temporary 
jobs remained very high and the conversion rate into open-ended contracts remained low and 
stable at around 4% of the total number of contracts (Bentolila et al. 2008). Since the 
approval of the 2006 reform, there has been a substantial reduction in the temporary 
employment rate but part of the reduction can be attributed to the large destruction of 
temporary jobs in the construction industry. However, as we demonstrate, the 1997, 2001 and 
2002 reforms have an effect on the assignment of workers to contracts by private firms in 
Spain and this constitutes a key part of our identification strategy.
1
 We choose not to exploit 
the 2006 reform as it affected all workers.  
 
Data 
The data we use in this paper are drawn from the Longitudinal Spanish Labour Force Survey 
(herein LSLFS). The LSLFS is a quarterly representative survey that provides a range of 
information on individual and work characteristics. It is a rotating panel data set that follows 
individuals for 6 consecutive quarters. It contains 2,592,221 observations for 830,373 
different workers in the period spanning 1
st
 quarter of 1996 to 4
th
 quarter of 2008.
2
 The 
chosen period is crucial for identification purposes since it contains a series of labor market 
reforms and both the period and the reforms are not associated with any major economic 
                                                          
1
 An additional requirement of our identification strategy is that these reforms do not have a direct effect on 
absenteeism. While a recent reform in 2012 was explicitly aimed at tackling problems related to workplace 
absenteeism, previous reforms did not have provisions aimed at addressing absenteeism, nor is absenteeism  
discussed as an issue in these reforms. Moreover, Blázquez (2012) demonstrates that the absence rates and 
levels of both temporary and permanent workers were stable over the period of 1996-2004. 
2
 The Spanish Labour Force Survey has been demonstrated to have an internationally consistent definition of 





 This makes it less likely that the decrease in temporary employment is due to a 
general drop in labor demand and employment levels. 
While we acknowledge that absenteeism in public sector employment is of interest, 
and this interest is reflected in previous research (Scoppa 2010b; De Paola, Scoppa and Pupo, 
2014), our identification approach is not well suited to the public sector. As the reforms acted 
to change dismissal costs to employers one might think that profit orientated, private sector, 
firms may be more responsive to these incentives.
4
 As a result, the paper focuses solely on 
the private sector where these incentives are likely to be more salient. This reduces our 
sample to 2,000,614 worker-time observations. 
Information on usual and actual hours of work per week forms the basis of our 
measures of both the extensive and intensive margins of absence. A range of previous 
literature has demonstrated how answers to usual hours can be used as a proxy for contractual 
hours (Barmby, Ercolani and Treble, 1999; Lozano, 2011, Green and Navarro, 2012; Shi and 
Skuterud, 2015). Answers to the actual hours question provides how many hours of work was 
actually conducted by the individual in the reference week. Hence, combinations of these two 
variables can be used to create measures of absence, and it has been demonstrated for 
instance, that this allows internationally comparable measures of absenteeism to be 
constructed (Barmby et al. 2002).   
The extensive absence margin is a variable that takes value 1 when usual hours are 
greater than actual hours and value 0 if they are the same. The intensive margins of absence 
are calculated as deviations from contractual hours either in absolute terms or as an absence 
rate. Hence, the hours a worker is absent per week is calculated as the difference between 
usual and actual hours, eit
u
itit HHA  . For ease of interpretation we multiply this number by 
60 so that the estimated coefficients are in terms of minutes of absence. The absence rate is 
defined as the ratio of the hours reported absent to contractual hours in the reference week 
u
ititit HAAR  . Respondents to the LSLFS provide information on the reasons for any 
difference between usual and actual hours. In our main models we use variation that is 
                                                          
3
 Our sample period covers a period of consistent economic growth in Spain and we stop our sample just after 
the fall of Lehman Brothers which could be considered as the start of the financial crisis. 
4
 Indeed, initial trials of our instrumental variable strategy, discussed below, for the public sector were not 
encouraging. These reforms often have a weak or no effect on the probability of gaining a permanent contract in 
the public sector. 
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reported by the worker corresponding to two measures of absenteeism, a broader one, general 
absence that includes all reasons by which usual and actual hours differ and another one that 
is restricted to sickness absence only.
5
 This is done for two main reasons. First, while existing 
literature has generally focussed only on sickness absence, this has been from administrative 
sources, which in that setting means absence due to sickness with pay (Ichino and Riphahn, 
2005; Bradley et al. 2014). In a survey data setting such as ours, it is not clear how an 
individual who, for instance took time off due to family/personal reasons, but claimed sick 
pay would respond. Moreover, as our interest is in how effort changes with employment 
protection, it seems appropriate to consider all variations in absence that may be correlated 
with contract type as any unplanned (to the firm) deviation from contractual hours may be 
costly to the firm. The second reason relates to potential inconsistencies in how sickness 
absence is recorded in the final period of our study (from 2005 on), where there appears to be 
a drop in the level of recorded sickness absence even where overall general absence remains 
stable. In this way, our general absence measures provide a valuable robustness check on the 
sickness absence results.  
As an additional restriction, in our main models we only measure negative deviations 
from contractual hours. In the case where actual hours are greater than usual hours (due to, 
for instance, overtime) we remove these observations from our sample, leaving a final 
estimating sample of 1,976,702. Excluding these observations may not be an obvious choice 
insofar as we are interested in all effort variation due to contract type. Indeed, previous 
research on Switzerland demonstrates that temporary workers work more unpaid overtime 
than permanent workers (Engellandt and Riphahn, 2005).  However, in unreported results, 
our main estimates are essentially unaffected by including these positive variations in 
working time. Moreover, we re-estimated models of contract effects on overtime only and 
found no evidence that contract type is associated with more, or less, overtime work.  
Our choice to examine three dimensions of absenteeism (the extensive margin and 
two forms of intensive margin) is motivated by a desire to illustrate a broad picture of 
absence behavior. That is, absenteeism may be higher amongst permanent workers due to it 
                                                          
5
 In the Spanish Labour Force Survey if actual hours are reported as less than contractual hours the respondent 
has to provide one out of sixteen categorical reasons for being absent. In unreported estimates, we also used a 
broader measure of sickness absence which also includes time off work due to other family and personal 
reasons. Our main results are robust to using this classification.  
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being a more frequent phenomenon amongst permanent contract workers or permanent 
workers taking longer absence spells. At the same time, using the absence rate, in addition to 
actual time absent, allows us to examine the robustness of our results to underlying variation 
in contractual hours.  
{{Place Figure 2 about here}} 
Figure 2 provides preliminary evidence on the association between general absence 
and contract type, where the three panels refer to our three measures of absenteeism. To aid 
with presentation we plot these as 5 year moving averages and show the timing of the four 
reforms where the 2006 reform is displayed for illustrative purposes. Three things are 
notable. First there is a marked and stable difference over time in the absence levels of 
temporary and permanent contract employees. For instance, temporary workers are, on 
average, absent from work 67 minutes less a week than permanent workers. Second, overall 
absence levels for both types of workers are high, which reflects the use of all differences in 
usual and actual hours. The final point relates to the reforms. There doesn’t appear to be any 
visual evidence of a direct relationship between the labor market reforms and the absence 
behavior of temporary and permanent workers. The contract gaps appear quite similar either 
side of the four reforms.  
Table A1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical analysis 
for the whole sample and by permanent and temporary workers, respectively. We show our 
absence measures, usual and actual hours, along with means for tenure, gender, marital status, 
education level and age. Not reported, but also included in all models are 9 industry 
dummies, 8 occupation dummies, 17 region dummies, year dummies and quarter dummies. 
 
Methodology and identification  
The effect of contract type on absence can be estimated as follows:  
,itititiit XPermA                                                                         (1) 
where β provides the conditional effect of working on a permanent contract on the absence of 
individual i at time t (Ait). While not the only issue, the chief threat to interpreting this effect 
as causal is the non-random assignment of workers to permanent contracts. Whilst this may 
take a number of forms, a salient factor is that firms will be more likely to offer permanent 
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contracts to harder working, more productive workers. If these characteristics are omitted 
from (1) we would expect OLS estimates of the contract effect to be biased downwards. In 
essence, the permanent contract effect estimate reflects the combination of the behavioral 
effect (if any) of employment protection on work effort (in expectation higher absence) and 
the comparison of inherently more productive workers in permanent contracts to less 
productive, temporary, workers. In an institutional setting such as Spain where dismissal 
costs are high, and hence there is more strict ‘rationing’ of permanent contracts one might 
expect this second source of selection bias to be more severe.  
Our identification approach draws upon Kahn (2010) who demonstrates the effect of 
European employment protection reforms on the incidence of temporary work contracts, and 
Kugler et al. (2003) who demonstrates how the 1997 reform increased the assignment of 
younger workers to permanent contracts in Spain. Specifically, we use as exclusion 
restrictions in the second-stage the effect of the 1997, 2001 and 2002 employment protection 
reforms for treated workers as a source of exogenous variation in the assignment of contract 
type.
6
 The standard identifying assumption is that the chosen instrumental variables are 
relevant and validly excluded. The relevance condition requires that there is a correlation 
between these reforms for the treatment group Z and the likelihood of permanent employment 
  0, PermZE . With respect to the validity condition, our assumption is that our instruments 
affect workers absence behavior only through its effect on permanent contracts but not 
directly   0, ZE . An argument in support of this assumption is that government policy 
aimed at introducing these new permanent contracts and reducing dismissal costs has had the 
primary objective of reducing the use of temporary contracts. Although workers’ absence 
leads to significant costs for firms, and in countries like Spain absence levels are very high, 
governments have generally ignored this aspect when designing employment protection 
reforms. Furthermore, it has been shown that there is no effect of these EPL reforms on the 
overall employment level in Spain (Kahn, 2010).  
A further concern is that the reforms had two components, tax breaks and also reductions 
in dismissal costs. The latter component has the potential to directly influence absence 
behaviour as it represents a reduction in EPL. We acknowledge this point but view the 
                                                          
6
  Similarly, Dolado et al. (2011) use the 1994, 1997 and 2001/2002 Spanish labour market reforms to identify 
the exogenous variation in the shares of temporary workers when they evaluate the impact of the extended use 
of temporary contracts on the productivity of Spanish manufacturing firms. 
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changes in dismissal costs between ‘old’ and ‘new’ permanent contracts as a relatively minor 
component. As discussed in the previous section, the new permanent contracts are still 
associated with dismissal costs that are very high even by European standards. Nonetheless, 
we seek to investigate the sensitivity of our results to this issue using the method developed 
by Conley et al. (2012). This approach allows for inference even in the situation where the 
reforms have a direct effect on absenteeism. This works by relaxing the exclusion restriction 
and providing inference under different assumptions regarding the direct effect of the 
instruments on our dependent variables of interest.  
We present OLS, Fixed Effects, IV and IV-FE estimates of the effect of permanent 
contracts on worker’s absence behavior based on variants of the following specification: 
,itititiit XPermA                                                                              (2) 
ititiit vXRRRPerm   200220011997 321                                                     (3) 
Where the parameter   in equation (2) provides the effect of being employed on a 
permanent contract, itPerm , on  workers’ absence behavior, itA . itPerm  is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if the worker is hired on a permanent contract and 0 on a temporary one. 
Our dependent variable, itA  is measured either at the extensive or the intensive margin of 
absence (absence incidence versus minutes difference or absence rate). X  is a set of standard 
control variables such as age dummies, gender, marital status, education, tenure, industry, 
occupation, regional, year and quarter dummies.  
Equation (3) provides the relationship between the probability of being employed on a 
permanent contract to the reforms of 1997, 2001 and 2002. R1997, R2001 and R2002 are 
dummy variables that take the value of unity for the treatment group after the reform was 
implemented and zero before implementation. We follow the approach of Kugler et al. (2003) 
in assigning workers to treatment by relying on age and gender variation in the coverage of 
each reform.
7
 The treatment group for the 1997 reform are workers 18-29 and older than 45 
years old; the treatment group for the 2001 reform are 16-17 year old workers and women in 
                                                          
7
 We do not exploit the changes in coverage in terms of the long term unemployed as this information is not 
consistently recorded in our data. These data issues are noted in Kugler et al. (2003).  
12 
 
occupations where they were under-represented.
8
 For 2002 the treatment group includes 
women in the years they are most likely to give birth (25-39 years old) from the 14
th
 of 
December 2002. As a result, the coefficients 1 , 2 and 3  are interpreted as the average 
increase in the probability of permanent employment attributable to the legal change. 
The estimate of contract effects on absence that we retrieve from (2) is a LATE for 
compliers. That is, workers who are offered, and take permanent contracts as a result of the 
reforms. These can be thought of as workers who were viewed as not suitable for permanent 
contracts under the old regime, but whom are now in expectation productive enough to be 
offered permanent contracts given the tax breaks and lower dismissal costs. Hence this is 
both a non-random group of the affected workers, and these workers are likely to have less 
favorable productivity characteristics than those who would have been offered a permanent 
contract in the absence of the reform (the always-takers). This leads to an expectation that 
this LATE will be larger than the estimate of contract effects from OLS. An additional issue 
is to note that the new permanent contract conditions did not influence those of workers who 
had already been hired under a permanent contract.  
 
Results 
Table 1 reports estimates of the relationship between permanent contract work and 
absenteeism, where for brevity we do not report the estimated parameters for the controls but 
these are available from the authors upon request.
9
 The extensive margin is estimated by 
Linear Probability Model (LPM) and the intensive margins by OLS.
10
 These estimates 
provide initial evidence that permanent workers have a statistically significant higher level of 
sickness absence and absence overall. However, the sickness absence differences are small in 
magnitude. For instance the OLS estimate of minutes difference between permanent and 
temporary workers, reveal that permanent workers take 3 more minutes per week off on 
average. Using a standard 8 hour working day, this is approximately 0.007 of a day per week. 
                                                          
8
 Occupations where women are under-represented are defined in the Orden Ministerial of 16 of September 
1998. 
9
 These covariate estimates follow patterns noted previously in the literature on worker absenteeism. 
10
 The sign, magnitude and significance of our estimates were unaffected when we estimated the absence rate 
with a Tobit model that takes censoring into account. Likewise estimation of the extensive margin by probit 
does not materially affect our estimates. 
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These small, but robust, differences are smaller than those reported in previous literature such 
as Ichino and Riphahn (2005) who observe a 0.04 of a day within worker effect of becoming 
permanent, or 0.017 of a day in Bradley et al. (2014) study of public sector workers in 
Australia. 
{{Place Table 1 about here}} 
Looking instead at the general absence results, these are substantially bigger, around 
49 minutes absence per week difference between temporary and permanent contract workers. 
This suggests that narrowly focusing on self-reported sickness absence may miss much of the 
variation in the effect of employment contract on worker absence. In turn, the estimates for 
general absence provide some initial indication of potentially large productivity differences 
across contract types. In practice these preliminary differences in absence by contract type 
may be related to fixed and time varying unobserved differences between workers hired on 
temporary and permanent contracts. Our estimation strategy seeks to address this by first 
considering models that include worker level fixed effects before moving on to IV estimation.  
Taking into account worker fixed effects reduces the impact of permanent contracts 
on general absence when compared to the OLS estimates, but remain large and statistically 
significant, in the order of 28 minutes per week. Again as a way of comparison to existing 
results the OLS estimate is 0.1 of a day difference in absence per week, while the FE estimate 
is 0.057.
11
 While smaller than the OLS, this is still larger than that typically reported in the 
literature. There is also a diminution of coefficient size between OLS and FE for the 
extensive margin and the absence rate. For sickness absence this pattern is less clear, while 
there are statistically significant differences by contract type, contract estimates for all 
absence measures are essentially unchanged across OLS and FE estimation.  
{{Place Table 2 about here}} 
One natural concern is the comparability of temporary and permanent workers. 
Temporary and permanent contracts are not randomly distributed across the Spanish labor 
market and one particular further concern may be that there is substantial selection into 
contract status on the basis of time varying unobservables. This will lead to biased estimates 
of contract effects on absenteeism. With this in mind we now proceed to our instrumental 
                                                          
11
 Based on a standard working day of 8 hours.  
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variable strategy where we exploit labor reforms as a source of exogenous variation in the 
assignment to contract type.  
Table 2 reports the instrumental variable estimates. The first stage estimates, which 
provide the effect of each reform on the probability of gaining a permanent contract, are 
informative in themselves. The 1997 reform (30
th
 of December 1997, first quarter of 1998), 
through the reduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs, increased the conversion of 
temporary into permanent contracts for young (18-29 years old) and older workers (+ 45 
years old) compared to workers in the middle age group (30-44 years old). The effect is a 2 
percentage point increase. This is similar to the estimates reported by Kugler et al. (2003) for 
the same reform in the order of 2.5 percentage points. We go further and show that all three 
reforms led to an increase in the likelihood of gaining a permanent contracted job. 
Specifically, the 2001 reform (11
th
 of July 2001, 3
rd
 quarter 2001) led to an increase in 2.6 
percentage points. The 2002 reform (14
th
 of December 2002, first quarter of 2003) also 
increased movement into permanent contracts but had a smaller effect of just 0.7 percentage 
points. This fits expectations insofar as the 2002 reform can be viewed as a minor extension 
of the previous two reforms. These results are interesting in themselves as they show how the 
reforms had incentive effects on private sector firms influencing their willingness to offer 
permanent contracts. In terms of diagnostics, our instruments are strong predictors of contract 
type. However, the Hansen-test leads us to reject the null hypothesis of the instruments being 
validly excluded from the absence equations. We return to this point later and examine the 
robustness of our results to relaxing this assumption.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the resultant IV estimates of permanent contract effects on 
absence. When compared to previous OLS and FE estimates these are markedly larger. For 
instance, the general absence effect on minutes absence is 8 times larger than the OLS and 10 
times larger in the estimate for the extensive margin. To be specific, the impact of permanent 
contract on general absence is that of six hours per week, this is equivalent to three quarters 
of a working day. IV estimates of the contract effect on minutes of sickness absence are of 
smaller magnitudes but substantially larger than the OLS estimates. These are in the order of 
147 minutes difference per week. Estimates of the extensive margin and absence rate for 
sickness absence remain positive but are imprecise. As discussed earlier, the larger estimated 
effects may reflect both the downward bias of the OLS estimates and the Local Average 
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Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation of the IV estimates. We investigate these issues with 
interpretation more fully later.  
Table A2 provides analogous IV-FE estimates of contract effects on absence. Note that 
approximately 100,000 individuals are dropped from the estimating sample as they are only 
observed once in the data. The first stage estimates of the effect of the reforms on the 
probability of being hired on a permanent contract are similar to those reported in Table 2. 
The resultant IV-FE estimates, while consistent with the earlier IV estimates, are of a smaller 
magnitude.  
{{Place Table 3 about here}} 
To this point we have found effects that are substantially larger than cohort based studies 
that examine early career workers without employment protection as they gain more 
permanent work. While we have limited our sample to temporary workers, this still includes 
workers with longer tenure and tenure is a known positive correlate of absenteeism with a 
non-linear relationship (Bradley et al. 2014), and permanent workers have markedly higher 
average tenure than temporary workers in our sample (130 months versus 19 months). 
Initially, we re-estimated our main models including an interaction between tenure and 
permanent contract. These interaction terms were typically not statistically significant at 
standard levels, and never of economically substantive magnitudes. To examine this further, 
we limit our sample first to those workers with less than 5 years of tenure, and then those 
with less than 2 years of tenure. In this sense, this sample is closer to existing studies that 
look at new workers without employment protection.  Insofar as these studies have 
demonstrated smaller effects than our estimates, this may hinge on factors such as relatively 
strong career concerns early in employment that serve to reduce all workers absence 
irrespective of employment protection. With this in mind, we restrict our sample by tenure of 
the worker in their first period of observation in the sample. We begin initially with those up 
to 5 years of tenure and this is followed by a sample of those with less than 2 years of tenure. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that this approach is not ideal insofar as tenure and 
contract status are co-determined.   
Our re-estimated IV models on these restricted samples are reported in Table 3. The first 
thing to note is that the first stage coefficients for the reforms become larger, and in general 
increase as we look at more narrow tenure groups of workers. This can be interpreted as 
showing that the effect of the reform was concentrated heavily in short tenure workers. Again 
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this is interesting as it provides a suggestion of which types of workers were most readily 
affected by these reforms. We report IV-FE estimates in Table A3. These, again, are 
consistent with the IV estimates in terms of sign and statistical significance, but are in some 
cases larger in magnitude. 
In terms of the absence estimates, these are generally much lower in the restricted tenure 
estimates compared to all workers. For instance, for workers with less than 2 years tenure the 
general absence effect of permanent work is 100 minutes, just over a quarter of the size of the 
estimate reported in table 2. However, there is little difference between those with less than 5 
years and those with less than 2 years. Moreover, there are more muted differences between 
estimates of contract effects on sickness absence across the full sample and the two sub-
samples. The corresponding estimates for the extensive margin and absence rate are between 
0.017 and 0.078. 
 Again we can use these estimates to compute weekly loss of time due to absence as a 
result of moving into a permanent contract. For workers with less than 5 years tenure this 
amounts to approximately 0.225 of a day per week in general absence, of which 0.123 is 
absence reported as being due to sickness. For workers with less than 2 years tenure it ranges 
between 0.209 of a day for general absence, and 0.080 for sickness absence.  Even in this 
very narrow tenure window our general absence effect is almost twice of that reported by the 
least conservative current estimates in the literature (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005). Moving to 
the 5 year tenure group the general absence effect of being employed on a permanent contract 
is over 5 times larger than that reported in Ichino and Riphahn (2005), and over ten times 
larger than that reported in Bradley et al. (2014). Our feeling is that our empirical strategy 
reveals substantial effects of contract status on absence, and insofar as this is a proxy for 
effort, productivity. This suggests that variations in employment protection can have marked 
effects on productivity both within countries, and potentially, cross-country.  
We further explore the robustness of our IV estimation. Specifically, we focus on three 
points. First, the result from employing all 3 policy instruments together (minutes difference 
= 100.376 (s.e. 25.693) and absence rate = 0.048 (s.e. 0.011) should correspond to a weighted 
average of IV estimates where each instrument is introduced individually. The initial panel of 
Table 4 reports the results from doing this and demonstrate that this, in essence, holds.  
Second, we recognize that for our reforms to influence absenteeism through contract type 
there needs to be a direct effect of these reforms for the treated group on absenteeism. We 
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investigate this by estimating the reduced form intention to treat (ITT) effect of the reforms 
on the treated group’s absence using the difference-in-difference approach along the lines set 
out in (3). The resultant coefficients for each reform are reported in Table 4. These 
demonstrate ITT estimates of a positive impact of each reform on worker absence.  
{{Place Table 4 about here}} 
A related concern is that the IV estimated coefficients remain large. This may be related 
to the proportion of compliers in the first stage estimates being small. In this case, it can be 
shown that the causal effect of permanent contracts on absence is the ITT effect (reduced 
form) divided by the first-stage or the compliance rate in the originally assigned treatment 
group. In this way, the second stage estimates can be viewed as a re-scaling of the reduced 
form (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Angrist and Krueger, 2001).  Hence, the large estimates for 
the 2002 reform reflect both a larger ITT effect but also a relatively low compliance rate. For 
instance, this reform was targeted at women who had given birth in the last 24 months. This 
is reflected in an estimated compliance rate of 1.8% which is substantially smaller than those 
reported for the other two reforms (5.8% and 7%, respectively).  
 Plausible Exogeneity 
Given that the instruments do not pass standard tests of validity, although the reforms 
were not designed with absenteeism or effort explicitly in mind, one may still be concerned 
that changes in the structure of employment protection in some way directly influence 
absence behavior. For instance, it may change the expected cost of detected shirking if there 
is an influence on outflows from unemployment.  
Likewise, as we note earlier the very nature of the reforms led to some lowering of 
dismissal costs associated with some permanent contracts, and this could influence absence 
behavior of permanent workers. We seek to examine the effect of potential violations of the 
exclusion of our reforms from the absence equations using the plausible exogeneity bounds 
estimator developed by Conley et al. (2012). This method seeks to assess whether it is 
possible to provide meaningful estimates in the scenario where the instruments may not be 
validly excluded.  




Consider the following absence equation, where Z is our instrument vector (labor 
market reforms for the corresponding treatment groups):  
ititititiit ZXPermA          (4) 
Conley et al. (2012) demonstrates that it is possible to provide informative inference even 
when there are large deviations from the exclusion restriction. Specifically, provided the 
instrument is strong, violation of the exclusion restrictions results only in a loss of precision. 
They develop different methods that combine information in the data with priors about , 
where valid exclusion ( 0 ) is a special case, to provide valid inference regarding  . We 
adopt two approaches and the results are reported in Table 5. In the first case, we use the 
local-to-zero method that employs priors with respect to the mean and variance-covariance 
matrix structure of   to construct 95% confidence intervals for the effect of permanent 
contracts on absenteeism. This is designed to produce an asymptotic approximation in which 
both sampling error and uncertainty regarding   play a role. The resultant approximation is 
the sum of the usual asymptotic distribution and an additional random variable which arises 
from the prior over  .  The second approach we use is the Union of Confidence intervals 
approach (UCI) where 95% confidence intervals for   are obtained conditional on any 
potential value of . Taking the union of these interval estimates across different   values 
provides a conservative interval estimate for  .  For both methods and for general and 
sickness absence, our estimates of the effect of permanent contracts on minutes difference 
remains significantly greater than zero at the 95% confidence level. Our estimates of the 
extensive margin and absence rate are less precise perhaps reflecting their limited dependent 
variable nature. Nonetheless when we use the local to zero approximation approach, these 
remain above zero at the 95% level (general absence) and at the 90% confidence level 
(sickness absence). These estimates suggest that, even in the case where our instruments are 
not validly excluded, under reasonable priors the likely effect of permanent contracts on 
worker absence is significantly greater than zero. However, using the UCI approach the lower 
bound confidence intervals for these absence measures overlap zero for both general and 
sickness absence. This provides a cautionary note with respect to our IV estimates of the 
effect of permanent contracts on both the extensive margin and the absence rate.
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 Table A4 provides corresponding estimates for our shorter tenure sub-samples. These essentially follow those 




The strong employment protection found in many areas of Europe has the potential to 
dramatically influence labor market performance and outcomes. For instance, a large 
literature has demonstrated the effects of these regimes on labor productivity and 
unemployment. The behavioral effect of employment protection on workers is less well 
understood. A recent literature has developed examining how employment protection 
conditions worker effort. This research has shown an effect of employment protection on 
absenteeism, but one that appears too small in magnitude to generate large differences in 
labor productivity. In practice, identifying causal effects of employment protection on effort 
is difficult, especially in a broad labor market setting. Our paper used a combination of within 
worker estimation and legislative changes in Spain as a source of exogenous variation in 
contract type to identify this effect. 
We demonstrate large effects of temporary contract on worker absence. This finding 
is robust to a range of sub-samples, and attempts to address issues related to the appropriate 
control group, and concerns over the validity of our exclusion restriction. This evidence 
demonstrates that variations in employment protection can have a marked effect on worker 
effort. In seeking to provide causal estimates of the effect of contract type on absenteeism we 
have used reforms that target specific sub-groups to attain LATE estimates. This raises 
standard concerns regarding the external validity of our results. Nonetheless, we feel that they 
indicate the potential for an effect of employment protection on cross-country variations in 
labor productivity. It also suggests that firms will factor in this behavioral aspect of 
employment protection as part of the decision of offering permanent, versus temporary, 
contracts. This may also indicate the need for firms to pursue other incentives for permanent 
workers such as performance pay, deferred compensation or the like which either implicitly 
or explicitly deter absenteeism. Future research could consider whether there is evidence of 
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Figure 1. Temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees in Spain, the 




































































































Figure 2. Absenteeism and Contract Type, Spain, 1994 – 2008 Private Sector 


























































































































































































































































Table 1. Permanent Contracts and Absence, Spain 1996-2008, OLS and FE Estimates, Private Sector Workers.  









Extensive margin 0.018*** 0.001*** 0.008*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Minutes diff 48.980*** 3.181*** 27.676*** 3.206*** 
 (1.008) (0.529) (2.506) (0.993) 
     
Absence rate 0.018*** 0.001*** 0.012*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 1976702 
Number of Workers 664705 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, respectively. All models include controls for gender, marital status, education, 
age, tenure, regions, years, occupation and industry. Each cell corresponds to estimates for the various absence definitions. The coefficient corresponds to the variable permanent contract.
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Table 2.  IV Estimates of the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private 
Sector Workers 1996-2008.  
Panel A   
First-Stage Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.020*** 
 (0.003) 
R 2001 0.026*** 
 (0.004) 
R 2002 0.007*** 
 (0.002) 
   
Partial R-squared 0.0001 
F-test of excl. 26.29 
p-value 0.0000 
Hansen test 216.363 121.913 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 







Extensive margin 0.186*** 0.053** 
  (0.071) (0.027) 
Minutes diff 412.298*** 146.554*** 
 (108.700) (56.627) 
Absence rate 0.180*** 0.035 
 (0.047) (0.025) 
Observations 1976702 1976702 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 level, 














Table 3.  IV Estimates of the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private Sector 
Workers 1996-2008. (Tenure <5yrs, Tenure <2yrs). 
Panel A Tenure < 5yrs Tenure < 2yrs 
First-Stage Permanent Contract Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.054*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
R 2001 0.097*** 0.063*** 
 (0.005) (0.002) 
R 2002 0.025*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
     
Partial R-squared 0.0011 0.0018 
F-test of excl. 218.45 664.54 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen test 99.469 64.481 29.638 52.258 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 











Extensive margin 0.062*** 0.026*** 0.078*** 0.018*** 
 (0.023) (0.009) (0.019) (0.006) 
Minutes diff 107.963*** 59.275*** 100.376*** 38.299*** 
 (32.083) (17.374) (25.693) (11.353) 
Absence rate 0.047*** 0.024*** 0.048*** 0.017*** 
 (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) 
Observations 1408082 1408082 1096269 1096269 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. All models include 











Table 4. Reduced forms, first stages and IV estimates for each reform separately 
Panel A Extensive margin 
 R 1997 R 2001 R 2002 
Reduced form  0.003* 0.004*** 0.007*** 
(ITT) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
First stage 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IV 0.059* 0.058*** 0.375*** 
 (0.030) (0.021) (0.096) 
Panel B Minutes difference 
 R 1997 R 2001 R 2002 
Reduced form  4.716** 3.307* 14.321*** 
(ITT) (2.367) (1.982) (2.356) 
First stage 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IV 82.076** 47.300* 772.905*** 
 (41.218) (28.337) (151.694) 
Panel C Absence rate 
 R 1997 R 2001 R 2002 
Reduced form  0.002* 0.002** 0.007*** 
(ITT) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
First stage 0.058*** 0.070*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
IV 0.034* 0.025** 0.361*** 
 (0.018) (0.012) (0.068) 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 









Table 5. Plausible Exogeneity and the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private 
Sector Workers.  








General Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.186 [0.005     0.367] -0.514 0.909 
 Minutes difference 434.872 [170.924    698.820] 171.309 375.516 
 Absence rate 0.182 [0.067    0.297] -0.4737 0.8677 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.053 [-0.007   0.112] -0.591 0.707 
 Minutes difference 144.064 [30.395    257.733] 4.674 57.573 
 Absence rate 0.036 [-0.016   0.087] -0.569 0.649 
























Table A1. Descriptive Statistics, Spain 1996-2008 
Variables All workers  Temporary Permanent 
General Absence    
Extensive margin 0.197 0.179 0.206 
 (0.397) (0.384) (0.404) 
Minutes diff 223.134 179.856 246.737 
 (579.327) (498.730) (617.599) 
Absence rate 0.098 0.081 0.108 
 (0.254) (0.223) (0.269) 
Sickness absence    
Extensive margin 0.017 0.015 0.019 
 (0.131) (0.123) (0.135) 
Minutes diff 29.426 26.115 31.231 
 (249.965) (235.111) (257.688) 
Absence rate 0.014 0.012 0.014 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.114) 
Usual minutes 2323.781 2242.679 2368.013 
 (531.969) (611.159) (477.574) 
Actual minutes 2100.647 2062.823 2121.275 
 (776.299) (764.772) (781.744) 
Permanent 
contract 0.647 0.000 1.000 
 (0.478) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tenure (months) 92.384 18.803 130.472 
 (112.450) (37.950) (119.129) 
Female 0.376 0.400 0.364 
 (0.484) (0.490) (0.481) 
Married 0.551 0.387 0.640 
 (0.497) (0.487) (0.480) 
Primary Educ 0.475 0.494 0.465 
 (0.499) (0.500) (0.499) 
Second Educ 0.269 0.283 0.261 
 (0.443) (0.450) (0.439) 
Higher Educ 0.256 0.223 0.274 
 (0.437) (0.417) (0.446) 
Age 16-19 0.032 0.076 0.008 
 (0.176) (0.264) (0.090) 
Age 20-24 0.127 0.233 0.070 
 (0.333) (0.423) (0.255) 
Age 25-29 0.162 0.210 0.135 
 (0.368) (0.407) (0.342) 
Age 30-34 0.144 0.136 0.149 





Age 35-39 0.133 0.107 0.147 
 (0.339) (0.309) (0.354) 
Age 40-44 0.122 0.088 0.141 
 (0.327) (0.283) (0.348) 
Age 45-49 0.105 0.064 0.128 
 (0.307) (0.245) (0.334) 
Age 50-54 0.086 0.046 0.108 
 (0.280) (0.209) (0.310) 
Age 55-59 0.059 0.028 0.076 
 (0.235) (0.164) (0.264) 
Age 60-64 0.027 0.011 0.036 
 (0.162) (0.106) (0.185) 
Observations 1976702 697602 1279100 
Source: Spanish Labour Force Survey 1996-2008. Reported are means of variables with standard 























Table A2.  IV-FE Estimates of the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private 
Sector Workers 1996-2008.  
Panel A   
First-Stage Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.025*** 
 (0.001) 
R 2001 0.010*** 
 (0.004) 
R 2002 0.016*** 
 (0.002) 
   
Partial R-squared 0.0003 
F-test of excl. 130.24 
p-value 0.0000 
Hansen test 12.044 0.833 
p-value 0.0024 0.6594 







Extensive margin 0.111*** 0.013*** 
  (0.015) (0.005) 
Minutes diff 223.444*** 30.136*** 
 (21.352) (7.945) 
Absence rate 0.101*** 0.018*** 
 (0.009) (0.004) 
Number of Workers 541825 541825 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level. All models include 











Table A3.  IV-FE Estimates of the Effect of Permanent Contracts on Absence, Private Sector 
Workers 1996-2008. (Tenure <5yrs, Tenure <2yrs). 
Panel A Tenure < 5yrs Tenure < 2yrs 
First-Stage Permanent Contract Permanent Contract 
R 1997 0.025*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
R 2001 0.010** 0.008* 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
R 2002 0.027*** 0.048*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 




F-test of excl. 113.82 133.47 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen test 11.272 0.272 20.623 1.946 
p-value 0.0036 0.8729 0.0000 0.3779 











Extensive margin 0.143*** 0.029*** 0.153*** 0.030*** 
 (0.017) (0.005) (0.025) (0.007) 
Minutes diff 269.087*** 54.862*** 289.869*** 47.600*** 
 (23.491) (9.013) (32.829) (13.014) 
Absence rate 0.125*** 0.030*** 0.139*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.015) (0.006) 
Number of 
Workers 
369272 369272 261958 261958 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, 









Table A4. Plausible exogeneity bounds estimates, subsamples  
 








Private Sector <5yrs 
Tenure 
    
General Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.062 [0.001     0.122] -0.152 0.276 
 Minutes difference 118.336 [34.447     202.226] 61.073 175.601 
 Absence rate 0.048 [0.011    0.085] -0.149 0.246 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.026 [0.006    0.045] -0.161 0.213 
 Minutes difference 59.363 [20.703    98.024] 32.491 86.238 
 Absence rate 0.024 [0.006    0.041] -0.159 0.207 
     
Private Sector <2yrs 
Tenure 
    
General Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.066 [0.011    0.122] -0.190 0.324 
 Minutes difference 100.548 [26.030    175.065] 47.027 154.070 
 Absence rate 0.042 [0.009    0.074] -0.201 0.285 
Sickness Absence     
 Extensive margin 0.019 [0.004    0.033] -0.081 0.118 
 Minutes difference 38.543 [10.255    66.832] 20.378 56.709 
 Absence rate 0.017 [0.005    0.030] -0.079 0.114 
Note: All controls as per Table 1.  
 
